University of Minnesota Law School

Scholarship Repository
Journal of Inequality Inquiry
2016

A Substantial Interest: Why The Government Is Legally Justified In
Prohibiting Disparaging Trademarks
Jessica Michael Van Muelken Mikkelson

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/jii

Recommended Citation
Mikkelson, Jessica Michael Van Muelken, "A Substantial Interest: Why The Government Is Legally
Justified In Prohibiting Disparaging Trademarks" (2016). Journal of Inequality Inquiry. 9.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/jii/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Inequality Inquiry collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

548

A Substantial Interest: Why the Government is
Legally Justified in Prohibiting Disparaging
Trademarks
By Jessica Mikkelson† and Michael Van Muelken††
Introduction
Imagine sitting down on a Sunday afternoon with friends and family to
watch your local football team play in “the big game.” Now picture the team
being cheered on by several thousand fans. It seems like an idyllic Sunday
afternoon. The only problem is that this team is named after a popular slur
used to identify your racial or ethnic group. This slur is broadcast over
television, the Internet, and in homes all across the country. This
hypothetical is a reality for Native Americans today.
It would seem logical to change the name because it is disparaging and
part of a horrible era in American history. Surprisingly, it took a large public
outcry before a district court concluded that the Washington Redskins’
trademark was disparaging, and not registrable as a trademark under the
Lanham Act.1 On the other hand, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, recently upheld the registration of the mark,
“The Slants,” for an Asian-American rock band.
The history of the First Amendment is too extensive to explain fully in
this Article. However, the trend in U.S. Supreme Court cases has been to
find content-based restrictions unconstitutional unless the legitimate
government interest withstands strict scrutiny.2 At first glance, the Lanham
Act’s prohibition on disparaging trademarks appears to be inconsistent.
However, the prohibition on disparaging trademarks is different because the
government is not telling people or entities that they cannot use a name,
writing, or mark; all that is rejected is the government’s public validation.
This is well within the government’s power.

†. J.D., Hamline University School of Law. She currently works as a housing
attorney at HomeLine.
††. J.D., University of Minnesota Law School.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012).
2. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992) (holding that a
city ordinance banning hate speech is unconstitutional based on the opinion of the
message expressed); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“[T]he government
may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea
itself offensive or disagreeable.”).
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Even though a trademark is not an absolute right, the government is
not permitted to deny the application based upon a constitutionally protected
right, in this instance free speech rights.3 Additionally, the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals found that issuing a trademark is not subjected to
Congress’s spending powers because the benefit is non-monetary.4 The
Lanham Act is derived from the Commerce Clause and it is designed to
regulate interstate commerce.5 Therefore, restrictions on disparaging marks
do not bear directly on the objectives of protecting the owner’s investment.6
In considering whether or not a trademark is actually commercial
speech, the Tam court found that the restrictions of the Lanham Act failed to
withstand the intermediate scrutiny challenge7: the government restrictions
on the band’s name were not narrowly tailored to meet a specific objective in
which the government has a substantial interest.8 All the arguments
proffered by the government in Tam were based on the government’s desire
to ban speech it finds offensive. This reasoning has never been a substantial
interest in justifying any disparaging marks.9
This decision opens the door for a wide variety of offensive trademarks
to be registered, and the Tam court recognized as much in its conclusion.10
Prior to this case, courts took the stance that the trademark registration was
not an attempt to legislate morality.11 Rather, a trademark used government
funding, a form of speech, to hold out to the world that the trademark was
neither scandalous nor offensive.12 The Tam decision has the most bearing
on the Washington Redskins litigation. This Article argues that, in light of
the Tam decision, it is unlikely the Washington Redskins will lose their
trademark.
I. Congress Has Historically Prohibited Scandalous or Immoral
Trademarks
Congress prohibited scandalous or immoral content first in the 1905
Trademark Act. Decades passed before the administrative decisions
interpreted what is scandalous by considering if it was “shocking to the sense
of propriety or call out condemnation.”13 Courts developed a two-part test to
3. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
4. Id. at 1354.
5. U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8; In re Tam, 808 F.2d at 1354.
6. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1354.
7. Id. at 1355.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1357.
10. Id. at 1357–58.
11. In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 486 (Cust. & Pat. App. 1981).
12. Id.
13. Jasmine Abdel-khalik, Disparaging Trademarks: Who Matters, 20 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 287, 294–95 (2015).
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determine what is scandalous: (1) determine the likely meaning of the mark
within the context of the associated goods or services in the application, any
other elements in the mark, and the marketplace; and (2) evaluate whether a
substantial composite of the general public would find the mark scandalous
in light of the contemporary application.14
Throughout the years, the following categories have been prohibited
from trademarks: political images, vulgar language, religious terms and
icons, sexual content, and identity issues involving race, gender, or sexual
orientation.15 Once an application is processed, there may still be public
opposition. A statement of use and intent is required to be filed as part of the
registration process.16 Registration is not a guaranteed use because any
trademark may be challenged based on the test for scandalous content.17
In the 1930’s, Representative Lanham began the process of rewriting
the scandalous requirement. Various speakers opposed removing the
scandalous requirement and leaving the limitation on disparaging because
these individuals thought it would become too narrowly interpreted.18 By
1939, the House of Representatives passed a bill that prohibited trademarks
that contained “matter which tends to disparage persons, living or dead,
institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or to bring them into contempt.”19
It was later found that the determination of what is disparaging was too
subjective.
In subsequent legislation, the term “disparage” was not removed or
changed.20 A second bill added the words “may disparage.” This was
defined as “to move, direct, or develop one’s course in a particular direction;
to exhibit an inclination or tendency.”21 This is clearly broader than
scandalous and leaves open the question of what is disparaging under the
Lanham Act.22 Currently, the United States Trademark and Patent Office
(PTO) has the burden of showing that the trademark is perceived as
disparaging before it can deny a trademark. Once the government
establishes a prima facie case, the applicant has the burden of rebutting it by
showing the trademark is not disparaging speech.

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id. at 296.
Id. at 295.
Id. at 297.
Id. at 299.
Id.
Id. at 300.
Id. at 301.
Id. at 301.
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II. The Tam Court’s Determination That Trademarks Were An
Expressive Speech Is Misguided
Filing for a trademark is indeed speech, and it is a powerful form of
commercial speech.
A trademark allows individuals to benefit
economically, but it in no way determines the reliability of a product because
the government is not communicating a message about the product.23 The
government can make viewpoint based restrictions on commercial speech.24
By refusing to register offensive trademarks, the government chills speech
because applicants will avoid submissions that are vulnerable to a Lanham
Act challenge.25 In fact, applicant uncertainty is inevitable because the
Lanham Act extends even to speech that may be disparaging, and the
government is not required to prove that it actually disparages a particular
group of individuals.26 However, the government is only placing restrictions
on a trademark and the applicant is still capable of using the name or
communicating a message through other forms of speech.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting en
banc recently held in In re Tam that Section 2(a) of the Lanham Trademark
Act’s (“§ 2(a)”) prohibition against the registration disparaging trademarks
violated the First Amendment because it constituted viewpoint
discrimination.27 Simon Shiao Tam (“Mr. Tam”) applied to the PTO for
registration of “The Slants.”28
The PTO concluded that Mr. Tam’s proposed trademark was
disparaging to people of Asian heritage and rejected the application.29 Mr.
Tam claimed that the name of the band was essentially a symbol of pride
meant to “take ownership” of Asian stereotypes.30 On review, the court of
appeals determined that Mr. Tam’s proposed trademark was protected by the
First Amendment and held that “§ 2(a) regulates expressive, not commercial
speech.”31 It found that strict scrutiny was the appropriate standard to apply
to this type of speech restriction. Under that standard, the court stated that
even if the government’s prohibition of disparaging trademarks was a
regulation of commercial speech, it lacked a substantial government interest
in its action in prohibiting the band’s name trademark because of its

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1321–22 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Id.
Id. at 1340.
Id. at 1341–42.
Id.
Id. at 1331.
Id. at 1332–33.
Id. at 1331.
Id. at 1355.
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disparaging nature.32 However, the Tam court based its conclusions on the
erroneous determination that strict scrutiny review applied.
A. Trademark Denial Based on Disparaging Nature Is a
Regulation of Commercial and Not Expressive
Speech.
The Tam court justified its decision by stating that although trademarks
have a commercial role, § 2(a) regulated the expressive aspects of the
mark.33 The court argued that it could not sustain the PTO’s decision on this
basis.34 Through this holding, it essentially ignored decades of binding
precedent. The U.S. Supreme Court roughly defined commercial speech as
“speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction.”35 Mr.
Tam unquestionably had intentions of proposing commercial transactions
with his band and proposed trademark. Instead of separating the perceived
commercial aspects of the proposed trademark with the expressive ones, the
court of appeals should have conceded that an application for a trademark
was commercial speech.
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council Inc., the Supreme Court maintained that for-profit motivation was
irrelevant in terms of determining whether speech was commercial.36 In a
separate case it was also suggested that a link between products and
economic drive could help determine whether speech was commercial in
borderline cases.37 In Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., the Court
determined that even though a company mailed mass advertisements and had
an economic motivation for doing so, this did not end the inquiry on whether
the mailing was considered commercial speech or not.38 However, these
combined factors tipped the scales in favor of the government, and the court
determined that the advertisements were considered commercial speech.39

32. Id. at 1368–71.
33. Id. at 1357.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1339.
36. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 773 (1975).
37. Leonardo Machado Pontes, Trademark and Freedom of Speech: A New
Comparison Between the U.S. and the EU System in the Awakening of Johan
Deckmyn v. Helena Vandersteen, 1, 6 (World Intellectual Prop. Org., Doc. Code
WIPO.IPL/GE/15/T3,
2015),
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/wipo_ipl_ge_15/wipo_ipl_ge_15_t3.pdf.
38. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983).
39. Id. at 67(considering three factors in determining commercial speech: (1)
whether it is meant to be an advertisement; (2) whether it references a particular
product; and (3) whether there is an economic motivation for disseminating the
material).
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Despite the Court’s holding in Bolger, the Tam court found that Mr.
Tam’s mark had predominantly expressive aspect, rather than a commercial
aspect, because of the perceived goals of the proposed band’s name.40
Regardless of the message that Mr. Tam meant to send to the public through
his band’s name, it can hardly be argued that he had no intention of
promoting his brand or had no economic motive for doing so. The Bolger
Court, however, also recognized that the advertisements “contain[ed]
discussions of important public issues.”41 In spite of this finding, the Bolger
Court found that the factors determinative of whether speech was
commercial or expressive.42
Without first addressing the factors provided in Bolger, the Tam court
used the inextricably intertwined test, in which the court determines whether
commercial and non-commercial speech are closely connected and
essentially inseparable.43 Using this test, the Supreme Court upheld a ban on
private commercial enterprises (with exceptions) operating on university
campuses.44 Fox, a student, sued to allow her and her fellow students to host
“Tupperware parties,” at which a company through a hostess would sell
Tupperware to a group of ten or more people and also provide lessons on
home economics.45 Fox argued that the mix of commercial activity and
teaching of other subjects were inextricably intertwined.46 The Court
disagreed, finding that there was nothing inextricable about selling
Tupperware and providing lessons on home economics.47 Similarly, Mr.
Tam’s mark is not inextricable with promoting social change and cultural
pride. The band has other means of expression at its disposal. Therefore,
since there is nothing inextricable about Tam’s cultural pride, the court
should have found that “The Slants” was commercial speech subject to
intermediate scrutiny.

40. See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1338 (“Mr. Tam explicitly selected his mark to
create a dialogue on controversial political and social issues. With his band name,
Mr. Tam makes a statement about racial and ethnic identity. He seeks to shift the
meaning of, and thereby reclaim, an emotionally charged word. He advocates for
social change and challenges perceptions of people of Asian descent. His band
name pushes people. It offends. Despite this—indeed, because of it—Mr. Tam’s
band name is expressive speech.”).
41. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67–68.
42. Id.
43. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1339 (citing Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C.,
Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988)).
44. Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 471–72 (1989).
45. Id. at 472.
46. Id. at 474.
47. Id.
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B. The Tam Court Incorrectly Applied the Central Hudson
Test Because Trademarks Are Commercial Speech
The Tam court concluded that the government failed to prove that there
was a substantial government interest in § 2(a)’s prohibition on disparaging
marks.48 Its conclusion rested on the test laid out by the Supreme Court in
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.49
Central Hudson recognized that commercial speech first “must concern
lawful activity and not be misleading.”50 Once the court has found that there
is a lawful activity then court must inquire “whether the government issue is
substantial[,] and if the regulation materially advances the government’s
interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that objective.”51
The court correctly concluded that Mr. Tam’s proposed trademark was
neither unlawful nor misleading.52 However, the court’s analysis of the
second part of the Central Hudson test was flawed. The court reasoned that
the interest of § 2(a) rested upon whether or not the government approved of
the message behind the mark.53 This was not correct. In the 1905
Trademark Act Congress established a two-part test to restrain the
government from infringing upon speech rights or reacting to an unpopular
message.54 Under the first prong, “The Slants” mark is unfit for a trademark
because the likely meaning in context with other markings and within the
marketplace embodied a stereotype. “The Slants” also failed under the
second prong because the general public would find the mark scandalous in
light of the contemporary application. Mr. Tam’s intent was not evident in
the mark, and the only message his commercial speech communicated was
the band name “The Slants” itself. The public may not know that the band
members are Asian and may never come to know Mr. Tam’s intent because
of the off-putting name. Mr. Tam’s intent was not the norm when this word
was spoken in reference to the Asian population, and history was not erased
through the word’s reclamation.
Although the Tam court drew analogies between trademarks and
copyright laws, the court was misguided. In a full copyrighted text, the
public is able to discern the speaker’s intent through consumption of the
entire work. Additionally, writings include historical events and serve to
educate the general public about times when people behaved poorly so as not
to repeat the mistakes in history. Finally, a written word promotes thought.
48. See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1358.
49. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
50. Id. at 566.
51. Id.
52. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1355.
53. Id.
54. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, §§1–30, 33 Stat. 724 (repealed Lanham Act of
1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427); see Abdel-khalik, supra note 13, at 294–95 (2015).
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Our society values an exchange of ideas and thoughts. In an effort to
continue with a free exchange of ideas, it is important that government does
not regulate a message because it is unpopular or reflects poorly on itself. At
the same time, the government is not the messenger via copyright because
credit for the idea is given to the author.55 In contrast, a trademark is given
by the government with the purpose of commercial exchange and some
minimal form of reliability. A trademark does not promote one product over
another, and it does nothing to advance a speaker’s thoughts. Rather the
trademark confers benefits to its user without communicating anything about
the producer or the reliability of the actual product. Therefore, a trademark
is distinguishable from a copyright.

III. The Washington Redskins Court Correctly Determined
That Trademarks Were Not Expressive Speech
The most recent string of trademark litigation prior to the Tam court
was the Washington Redskins’ trademark case, Pro Football, Inc. v.
Blackhorse (“PFI”).56 This trademark, well-known to football and nonfootball fans alike, has been with the team since 1932 when George Preston
first purchased the team.57 Sixty years later, a group of Native Americans
sought to prevent the team from further using this trademark by filing a
petition with the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB).58 Among
other things, TTAB argued that the trademark can potentially disparage
Native Americans.59 One of the most controversial developments took place
when the PFI court issued a ruling in 2014 that the trademark was canceled
because the team’s name was disparaging to Native Americans.60
Many individuals in the general public requested that the pro football
team be required to change its name because it was offensive and was a
racial slur that denigrates Native Americans. In reaction to that claim, the
team stated that it did not wish to change the name because their intent
behind the name was to celebrate the contributions made by Native
Americans.61 In light of the most recent decision made by the Tam court, the
pro football team will not be required to change its name. The Tam court
ignored the prior ruling in this litigation that found § 2(a) does not receive

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Pro Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 442 (E.D. Va. 2015).
Id.
Id. at 448.
Id. at 439.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 487.
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First Amendment protections and, as a form of government speech, is
exempt from strict scrutiny.62
In fact, the PFI court was correct in finding that denying a trademark
registration does not infringe upon speech rights because denying trademarks
does not proscribe an individual’s conduct, only government endorsement.63
Under this logic both Mr. Tam and the Washington football team could
continue to exercise their free speech because the government did not say
that they could not continue using the chosen name. Rather, the government
will simply not register any disparaging or scandalous trademarks.64 The
key here is the registration, not the speech, and the commercial benefits
registration confers. Mr. Tam and the Washington football team are still
capable of enlightening the public of their pride in a particular heritage
without a trademark. What seemed to escape the Tam court is the rationale as
to why neither Mr. Tam nor the Washington football team would want to
decline to do so without a trademark. That motive was purely economic in
nature which suggests that a trademark was more commercial speech than
expressive speech.
Conclusion
The Tam case represents important issues in trademark law in the
United States today. In an era where Americans are becoming increasingly
sensitive to hurtful stereotypes promoted by businesses, we ask ourselves
how far we are willing to tolerate such symbols and whether we even have a
choice in the matter. In the case of “The Slants,” the court’s decision sets a
precedent that focuses on the subjective intention of those proposing the
trademark. The issue in this case was not speech, but registration of the
trademark itself. The government is not proposing that either entity cannot
use a symbol, word, or other mark; rather that it will not register disparaging
or scandalous trademarks. This is because the government has a substantial
interest in preventing the perpetuation of slurs and stereotypes that are
furthered every time there is an advertisement, a live event, or even a simple
sale of merchandise.

62. Id. at 441 (“Federal law does not create trademarks.”) (quoting In re Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879)).
63. Id. at 439.
64. Id. at 455.

